Abstract-We construct a secure network coding that is strongly secure in the sense of Harada and Yamamoto [19] and universal secure in the sense of Silva and Kschischang [28] , [29] , while allowing arbitrary small but nonzero mutual information to the eavesdropper. Our secure network coding allows statistically dependent and non-uniform multiple secret messages, while all previous constructions of weakly or strongly secure network coding assumed independent and uniform messages, which is difficult to be ensured in practice.
proof for weakly and strongly secure network coding without uniformity or independence assumption. On the other hand, non-uniformity of secret messages has been considered in the ordinary secure network coding [9] , [32] (see also the survey [6] ). In [6] , [9] , [32] , the randomness to hide a secret message was assumed to be statistically independent of the secret message, while our present study allows them to be statistically dependent.
We shall propose a construction of secure network coding. Our construction is strongly secure in the sense of [19] and universal secure in the sense of [28] , [29] . Moreover, we do not make the uniformity nor the independence assumption on multiple secret messages. The optimality of our construction is verified under the uniformity and independence assumption at the end of Remark 7.
However, we relax an aspect of the security requirements traditionally used in the secure network coding. In previous proposals of secure network coding [3] , [7] , [19] , [28] , [29] it is required that the mutual information to the eavesdropper is exactly zero. We relax this requirement by regarding sufficiently small mutual information to be acceptable. This relaxation is similar to requiring the bit error rate to be sufficiently small instead of strictly zero. Also observe that our relaxed criterion is much stronger than one commonly used in the information theoretic security [25] . Our construction can realize arbitrary small mutual information if coding over sufficiently many symbols in single packet is allowed. This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews related results used in this paper. Section III introduces the strengthened version of the privacy amplification theorem and the proposed scheme for secure network coding. Section IV concludes the paper.
Part of this paper was reported as earlier proceedings papers [26] , [27] . We substantially rewrote our security proof in [27] so that we can analyze the security with dependent and nonuniform multiple secret messages, which was not done in [27] . We borrowed ideas from [26, Section IV] and extended them in Appendix B so that we can prove Lemma 5.
II. Preliminary

A. Model of network and network coding
As in [3] , [7] , [10] , [19] , [28] , [29] we consider the single source multicast, and assume the linear network coding [23] , [24] . The source node is assumed to have at least n outgoing links. For i = 1, . . . , n, the source node prepares a packet P i consisting of m symbols in F q , and transmits an F qlinear combination of P 1 , . . . , P n to each outgoing link, as explained in [15, Section 2.1] . At an intermediate node, only packets generated at the same time by the source node are linearly combined, as explained in [15, Section 2.5]. The linear combination coefficients at each node are fixed so that all the legitimate receivers can decode n packets P 1 , . . . , P n from the source node.
If the random linear network coding [21] is employed, we have to also include so-called encoding vectors in each packet P i [15, Section 2.2]. We ignore those encoding vectors because they do not carry secret information.
Hereafter, we shall only consider the eavesdropper Eve and forget about the multiple legitimate receivers. The n packets P 1 , . . . , P n carry in total mn symbols in F q . We shall propose a method encoding secret information into mn symbols by the source node. The mn symbols obtained by the proposed method are distributed to packets P 1 , . . . , P n .
Eve can eavesdrop µ links. We assume µ ≤ n throughout this paper. The total number of eavesdropped symbols is therefore mµ. The set of µ eavesdropped links is assumed to be fixed during packets P 1 , . . . , P n are traveling on the network, as assumed in [28] , [29] . The situation considered here also includes the conventional store-and-forward network as a special case.
B. Security definitions
Definition 1 (Strongly secure network coding): [19] Let m = 1, and S 1 , . . . , S n ∈ F n q be messages. Let I ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, and Z be Eve's observation by eavesdropping µ links. A network coding is said to be (η, µ)-strongly secure if I(S I ; Z) = 0 for all I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≤ η, where S I = [S i : i ∈ I] and I(S I ; Z) denotes thier mutual information as defined in [12] . Harada and Yamamoto [19] showed a procedure to construct (n − µ, µ)-strongly secure network coding under the uniformity and independence assumption on the messages S 1 , . . . , S n . Note that in the definition of (η, µ)-strong security above, we have an extra parameter η in addition to µ. The parameter η was implicit in [19] .
We want to consider the universal security studied in [28] , [29] , and also want to use multiple symbols in a single packet P i , that is, m > 1. So we introduce our version of universal strong security, by following the approach initiated by Silva and Kschischang [28] , [29] .
Definition 2: Assume that we are given a linear network coding for single source multicast. Assume also that linear coding at intermediate nodes and the set of µ eavesdropped links are fixed when packets P 1 , . . . , P n travel from the source node to all the legitimate receivers. Suppose that we have T +1 messages S 1 , . . . , S T +1 and S i ∈ F k i q . S T +1 denotes randomness not intended as a message. We assume
. . , T }, and Z be Eve's observation. A linear transformation of S 1 , . . . , S T +1 at the source node is said to be a universal (η, µ)-strongly secure network coding if for all linear coding at intermediate nodes and all sets of µ eavesdropped links we have I(S I ; Z) = 0,
for all I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with i∈I k i < mη, where
C. Two-universal hash functions
We shall use a family of two-universal hash functions [11] for the privacy amplification theorem introduced later.
Eve Fig. 1 . Proposed coding scheme for the universal strongly secure network coding Definition 3: Let F be a set of functions from a finite set S 1 to another finite set S 2 , and F a random variable on F . If for any x 1 x 2 ∈ S 1 we have
then F with the probability distribution of F is said to be a family of two-universal hash functions.
III. Construction of universal strongly secure network coding A. Strengthened privacy amplification theorem
In order to evaluate the mutual information to Eve when the sum rate of multiple secret information is large, we need to strengthen the privacy amplification theorem originally appeared in [2] , [20] as follows. The following theorem is a slightly enhanced version of [27, Theorem 2] .
Theorem 4: Let X and Z be discrete random variables on finite sets X and Z, respectively, and F a family of functions from X to S. Let F be a random variable on F . Assume that X and F are conditionally independent given Z, and that for any fixed realization z of Z, the probability distribution of F given z satisfies the condition for a family of two-universal hash functions. Then we have
for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. We use the natural logarithm for all the logarithms in this paper, which include ones implicitly appearing in entropy and mutual information. Otherwise we have to adjust the above inequality. Proof: Proof is given in Appendix B.
B. Description of the proposed scheme and analysis of its mutual information
In this section, we shall provide a universal (n − µ − δ ρ , µ)-strongly secure network coding in a slightly modified sense of Definition 2, where δ ρ is a parameter measuring conditional non-uniformity to be defined in Eq. (10) . We assume that we have T secret messages, which can be dependent or non-uniform, and that the i-th secret message is given as a random variable S i whose realization is a row vector in F k i q . The sizes k i are determined later. We shall also use a supplementary random message S T +1 taking values in F k T +1 q when the randomness in the encoder is insufficient to make S i secret from Eve. By S we denote the entire collection (S 1 , . . . , S T +1 ) of messages. We assume
Let L be the set of all bijective F q -linear maps from
q to itself, and L the uniform random variable on L statistically independent of S = (S 1 , . . . , S T +1 ), and arbitrary fix nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. The source node store LS t into packets P 1 , . . . , P n defined in Section II-A and send them via its n outgoing links, where t denotes the transpose of a vector. Our construction just attaches a bijective linear function to an existing network coding. This coding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The legitimate sender and all the legitimate receivers agree on the choice of L. The eavesdropper Eve may also know their choice of L. Choice of L is part of protocol specification, the chosen L is repeatedly used, and agreement on its choice among legitimate sender and receivers is not counted as consumption of the network bandwidth. A legitimate receiver can recover S 1 , . . . , S T , S T +1 by multiplying L −1 to his/her received information. By the assumption on Eve, her information can be expressed as BLS t by using a mµ × mn matrix B over F q as in [28] , [29] .
For the nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, denote the collection of random variables [S i : i ∈ I] by S I , denote [S i : i ∈ {1, . . . , T + 1} \ I] by S I , and let k I = i∈I k i .
For a fixed realization of L, the information gained by Eve is measured by the mutual information I(S I ; BLS t |L = ) as a common practice in the information theoretic security [4] , [25] . Since its average E I(S I ; BLS t |L = ) is the conditional mutual information I(S I ; BLS t |L) [12] , we will upper bound I(S I ; BLS t |L). After upper bounding the average I(S I ; BLS t |L) in Eq. (5), we can ensure that for most choices of and all possible B, I(S I ; BLS t |L = ) is small, as done in Eq. (9) .
In order to use Theorem 4, we introduce a lemma. Lemma 5: For fixed B, the family of mapping S → BLS t is a family of two-universal hash functions to the rank(B)-dimensional F q -linear space.
Proof: See Appendix B. We can upper bound I(S I ; BLS t |L) as follows, by applying Theorem 4 with X = S , Z = S I , and F(X) = BLS t .
E exp(ρI(S I ; BLS t |L = ))
From Eq. (4) we have
Fix a real number C 1 > 1. Equation (5) This means that a realization of L satisfies
for all the (2 T − 1) nonempty subsets I of {1, . . . , T } with probability at least 1−(2 T −1)/C 1 . Defining another subset L I,2 := { | exp(ρI(S I ; BLS t |L = )) > C 1 E exp(ρI(S I ; BLS t |L = ))}, by Eq. (4) and the Markov inequality we obtain
Therefore, a realization of L satisfies both Eq. (6) and
with probability at least 1 − 2 × (2 T − 1)/C 1 . Equation (7) implies
Up to now we considered fixed B. We need to ensure that the mutual information is small for any B in order to show the universal security in [28] , [29] . Let x i, j ∈ F q be the j-th symbol in the i-th packet P i defined in Section II-A. Then there exists an µ × n matrix B µ×n such that what are observed by Eve at the j-th symbols in her eavesdropped µ packets is expressed as B µ×n (x 1, j , . . . , x n, j ) t for j = 1, . . . , m. The matrix B is completely determined by B µ×n . Let A be any nonsingular µ × µ matrix over F q , and the mµ × mn matrix B correspond to AB µ×n . Then I(S I ; BLS t |L = ) = I(S I ; B LS t |L = ).
The number of nonsingular µ × µ matrices over F q is
Therefore, the number of matrices B's that give different mutual information I(S I ; BLS t |L = ) is upper bounded by
Therefore, the probability of L satisfying Eqs. (6) and (8) simultaneously for all possible B is at least
Recall that chosen L is part of protocol specification and repeatedly used. Because Eqs. (6), (8) and (9) are independent of realization of the random variable S representing secret information, Eqs. (6) and (8) are satisfied in every repeated use of L with probability at least Eq. (9). We need to clarify under what condition Eq. (6) converges to zero as m → ∞. To do so, we shall introduce a version of conditional Rényi entropy introduced in [20] . There seems to be no standard definition for the conditional Rényi entropy, for example, definitions in [2] and [18] disagree and our definition in [20] is different from [2] , [18] . For discrete random variables X, Y, define conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + ρ as
For ρ = 0, we define H 1 (X|Y) as lim ρ→0 H 1+ρ (X|Y). By using l'Hôpital's rule we see that H 1 (X|Y) is equal to the conditional Shannon entropy. Observe also that H 1+ρ (X|Y) = ln |X| if X is conditionally uniform given Y, where X denotes the alphabet of X. In order to clarify under what condition Eq. (6) converges to zero, we need to assume some knowledge on P S I |S I (S I |S I ). We consider the situation with which each message S i originates from a different organization and it is compressed before network coded. Under such situation, we assume that S I is nearly conditionally uniform given S I . We assume that we have a nonnegative constant δ ρ such that
for some 0 < ρ ≤ 1, for all I, and for sufficiently large m.
Observe that if all messages S i 's are uniform and independent then δ ρ = 0. The parameter δ ρ captures the deviation from the uniform and independent situation in terms of conditional Rényi entropy per the number m of symbols in single packet. By taking the natural logarithm of Eq. (6), we see ln [RHS of Eq. (6)]
When (10)).
We see that we can make the upper bound Eq. (8) on the equivocation rate
by letting m be large. By the above construction and evaluation of mutual information, we provide a universal (n − µ − δ ρ , µ)-strongly secure network coding in the sense of Definition 2 with the zero mutual information requirement in Eq. (1) replaced by arbitrary small one (see also Remark 7).
Remark 6: The meaning of C 1 is as follows: At Eqs. (4) and (5), there might not exist a realization of L that satisfies Eqs. (4) and (5) for all subsets I of {1, . . . , T } simultaneously. By sacrificing the tightness of the upper bounds, we ensure the existence of satisfying Eqs. (6) and (7).
Remark 7: Under the assumption that all messages S 1 , . . . , S T +1 are uniform and independent, the mutual information can be made exactly zero for every eavesdropping matrix B. The reason is as follows: For fixed B and L = , we have
The first term H(S I |L = ) is an integer multiple of ln q since S I is assumed to have the uniform distribution. Let α I be the projection from
q for ∅ I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. For fixed B and , and a given realization z of B S t , the set of solutions s such that z = B s is written as ker(B )+ some vector v. This means that the set of possible candidates of S I given realization z of B S t is written as α I (ker(B )) + α I (v), and S I given realization z is uniformly distributed on α I (ker(B )) + α I (v). Since the cardinality of α I (ker(B )) + α I (v) is independent of S t for fixed B and , the second term H(S I |BLS t , L = ) is also an integer multiple of ln q. Therefore, if Eq. (6) holds for every B as verified in Eq. (9) and the RHS of Eq. (6) is < ln q, then the LHS of Eq. (6) must be zero. Observe that under this assumption our construction is a universal (n − µ, µ)-strongly secure network coding in the exact sense of Definition 2. The parameter (n−µ, µ) is optimal according to [6] .
C. Numerical example of explicit computation of required block size m
In this section we give a numerical example of computing required block length m in order to ensure the mutual information is below some value. In order to do so, we need an estimate of E[P S I |S I (S I |S I ) ρ ]. We assume to have δ 0.5 = 5 in Eq. (10) at ρ = 0.5.
Let q = 256, n = 100, µ = 30, T = 5, k i = 20m for all i. We do not have S T +1 . We want to ensure that we choose with probability at least 1−10 −12 such that I(S i ; BLS t |L = ) < 10 −6
for all i = 1, . . . , 5. By Eq. (9) we choose C 1 as
By using δ ρ , we can upper bound the RHS of Eq. (6) as follows: (10)). (15) In order to keep the above upper bound to be below 10 −6 we have to choose
This means that we choose the matrix L at least as large as 9400×9400 over F 256 , which seems implementable. Recall that we assumed n = 100 outgoing (logical) links from the source node and that each outgoing link carries m = 94 symbols in single coding block in this example. With this example, we can also see that the exponent nµ in Eq. (9) has large influence in the required size of m.
Remark 8: A vector in F mn q can be identified with an element in F q mn , and multiplication by a nonzero element in F q mn is an F q -linear mapping and can be identified with an element in L. Let L F q mn be a commutative subgroup of L whose elements can be identified with nonzero elements in F q mn . By looking at the proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix B, we can see that L F q mn can be used in place of L in our construction. Necessary storage space to record choice of an element in L F q mn is that of mn F q symbols and is smaller than that of L. Matrix multiplication by an element in L F q mn is at least as fast as that in L.
IV. Conclusion
In the secure network coding, there was loss of information rate due to inclusion of random bits at the source node. Weakly and strongly secure network coding [3] , [5] , [19] , [28] remove that loss of information rate by using multiple messages to be kept secret from an eavesdropper, which require huge computational complexity in code construction or huge finite field size. In addition to this, the previous studies assumed uniform and independent multiple messages, which seems too strong assumption in practice. In this paper, we have shown that random linear transform of multiple messages at the source node realizes the strongly secure network coding with arbitrary high probability with sufficiently large block length. We did not assume uniformity nor independence in multiple messages. Our numerical example in Section III-C showed that "sufficiently large block length" can be small.
Appendix A Proof of Theorem 4
In order to show Theorem 4, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 9: Under the same assumption as Theorem 4, we have
Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof of Lemma 9: Fix z ∈ Z. With a fixed realization z of Z, by the assumption in Theorem 4 two random variables F and X are statistically independent. The concavity of x ρ for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 implies
Since f is chosen from a family of two-universal hash functions defined in Definition 3, we have
Since any two positive numbers x and y satisfy (x+y)
By Eqs. (17) and (18) we can see
Taking the average over Z of the both sides of the last equation, we have
Define g(ρ) = E XZ P f (X)|Z ( f (X)|Z) ρ as a function of ρ with fixed f and P XZ , and h(ρ) = ln g(ρ). We have
Define (X , Z ) to be the random variables that have the same joint distribution as (X, Z) and statistically independent of X and Z. To examine the sign of h (ρ) we compute
This means that h (ρ) ≥ 0 and h(ρ) is convex. We can see
By Eqs. (19) and (20) By Lemma 11 we can see that the proposition is true. Proof of Lemma 5: Lemma 5 is equivalent to Proposition 12.
